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The Fair Sentencing Act Meets the Tender Mercies of
North Carolina Trial Judges
In 1979 the North Carolina General Assembly passed the Fair Sentencing
is assigned to a4
Act.' The Act establishes a framework whereby each felony
3
class of offenses.2 Each class is assigned a maximum and a presumptive
prison term. During the sentencing portion of a criminal trial, the judge, if he
imposes a prison term, "must impose the presumptive term provided in [the
statute] unless, after consideration of aggravating or mitigating factors, or
both, he decides to impose a longer or shorter term." 5 The Act enumerates
several aggravating and mitigating circumstances that the judge must consider,
but also allows the judge to consider any other factors he believes are related
to the purposes of sentencing and are supported by a preponderance of the
6
evidence.
In the two and one-half years since the Fair Sentencing Act went into
effect, distinct trends have developed in the judicial interpretation of the Act.
Foremost among these trends is limited review of both the trial judge's definition of aggravating or mitigating circumstances and his factual determination
that these circumstances exist. This note contends that such limited review
defeats the Act's original purpose of providing greater certainty in the length
of prison sentences and increases the danger of convicting a defendant of a
crime with which he never was charged.
The Act had its genesis in several years of study by the General Assembly's Commission on Correctional Programs. 7 The Commission found that
broad disparities in sentences and actual prison terms were a primary cause of
prison unrest,8 and concluded that sentences certain in length would be more
effective deterrents to crime.9 The Commission observed that disparities in
sentencing generally were caused by the broad discretion allowed to trial
judges and parole authorities. 10 Influenced by the report of the Twentieth
Century Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing, " the Commission recomI. Fair Sentencing Act, ch. 760, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 850 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
15A-1340.1 to .7 (1983)). The Act applies to felonies committed on or after July 1, 1981. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.1(a) (1983).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.1(a) (1983). Specific felony classifications are found in each

§§

felony subsection of the criminal law section of the North Carolina General Statutes.
3. Id. § 14-1.1(a) (1981).
4. Id. § 15A-1340.4(f) (1983).
5. Id. § 15A-1340.4(a).
6. Id.
7. Comment, The North Carolina FairSentencingAct, 60 N.C.L. REV. 631, 631 (1982).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. NORTH CAROLINA ACADEMY OF TRIAL LAWYERS EDUCATION FOUNDATION, HISTORY
OF PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING AND PROVISIONS OF THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW, PRESUMPTIVE

SENTENCING AND JURY TRIAL OF A DUI CASE 2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as HISTORY OF PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING].
11. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976).
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mended the use of a presumptive sentencing system in North Carolina.' 2 It
theorized that greater uniformity in sentencing would be encouraged by a system that forced a judge wishing to deviate from the presumptive term both to
make written findings and to risk reversal on appeal. 13 In 1977 a bill based on
the Commission's findings was introduced in both houses of the General Assembly. In both houses it died in committee. 14 The bill's defeat was caused
largely by trial judges and practicing attorneys who feared that the bill would
curtail severely judges' sentencing discretion.' 5
After the 1977 defeat, the North Carolina Bar Association established a
Committee on Sentencing.' 6 The bill was revised and renamed the Fair Sentencing Act.' 7 The Act contained four stated purposes. The most important
purpose of the bill was "to impose a punishment commensurate with the injury the offense has caused, taking into account factors that may diminish or
increase the offender's culpability."' 8 The next two purposes were "to protect
the public by restraining offenders" and "to assist the offender toward rehabilitation and restoration to the community as a lawful citizen."' 9 The Act's final
stated purpose was to deter crime by creating more uniform sentences. 20 The
2
bill was enacted with only minor changes by the 1979 General Assembly. '
Because of postenactment controversy regarding the Act, its effective date was
delayed, 22 and, in response to concern over the length of prison terms,2 3 the
presumptive sentences for several classes of felonies were reduced by as much
as one-fourth.2 4
The North Carolina Supreme Court first fully discussed the Act in 1983.
26
In State v. Ahearn2 5 defendant had battered his girlfriend's child to death.
At the guilt-determination phase of the trial, defendant entered pleas of guilty
to felonious child abuse and voluntary manslaughter.2 7 The trial judge found
three aggravating factors and five mitigating factors.28 He filled out only one
12. HISTORY OF PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING, supra note 10, at 26.
13. Comment, supra note 7, at 649-50.
14. Id. at 631.

15. Id. at 631-32 & n.8.
16. Id. at 632.
17. Fair Sentencing Act, ch. 760, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 850 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.

§§ 15A-1340.1 to .7 (1983)).
18. Id. at 851.

19. Id.
20. Id. The fourth purpose stated in the Act was to "provide a general deterrent to criminal
behavior." Id.
21. Fair Sentencing Act, ch. 760, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 850 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 15A-1340.1 to .7 (1983)).
22. Comment, supra note 7, at 633. The Act originally was applicable to felonies committed
on or after July 1, 1980, but enforcement was delayed until after July 1, 1981. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1340.1(a) (1983).
23. North Carolina had the third-longest average time served for felonies in the United
States. Nat'l L.J., Feb. 23, 1981, at 21, col. 1, 28, col. 3.
24. Comment, supra note 7, at 633.
25. 307 N.C. 584, 300 S.E.2d 689 (1983).
26. Id. at 586-87, 300 S.E.2d at 691-92.
27. Id. at 585, 300 S.E.2d at 690-91.
28. The aggravating factors were: (1) the especially heinous nature of the offense; (2) the age
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sentencing form, however, thereby treating the aggravating and mitigating fac29

tors together for both child abuse and manslaughter sentencing purposes.

He then concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors,30 and sentenced defendant to five years on the child abuse charge and
sixteen on the manslaughter charge. 3 1 Because both sentences exceeded the

presumptive term, defendant was entitled to appeal to the North Carolina
Court of Appeals as a matter of right. 32 Defendant argued that none of the
aggravating factors were supported by the evidence. 33 The court of appeals,

lacking any other indication of the trial judge's interpretation, assumed that all
factors were relevant to both charges. 34 Although the court invalidated sev-

eral of the factors, 35 it refused to find prejudice toward defendant because the
trial judge could have determined that the remaining aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating. 3 6 Defendant appealed to the North Carolina
Supreme Court, arguing that the court of appeals' refusal to find prejudice was
37

error.
In reversing the court of appeals and remanding the case, 38 the supreme
of the victim; and (3) defendant's dangerousness to himself and others. The mitigating factors
were: (1) defendant's lack of a criminal record; (2) defendant's mental and physical conditions; (3)
defendant's immaturity or limited mental capacity; (4) defendant's voluntary acknowledgement of
wrongdoing; and (5) defendant's good reputation. State v. Ahearn, 59 N.C. App. 44, 45-46, 295
S.E.2d 621, 622-23 (1982), rev'd, 307 N.C. 584, 300 S.E.2d 689 (1983).
29. Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 592, 300 S.E.2d at 694. Because only one sentencing form was completed, it was impossible to determine which aggravating and mitigating factors applied to each
charge.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 585, 300 S.E.2d at 690-91.
32. Appeals are authorized as a matter of right by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1444(al) (1983).
33. State v. Ahearn, 59 N.C. App. 44, 48, 295 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1982), rev'd, 307 N.C. 584, 300
S.E.2d 689 (1983).
34. 4hearn, 307 N.C. at 592, 300 S.E.2d at 694 (describing court of appeals' analysis).
35. State v. Ahearn, 59 N.C. App. 44, 48-49, 295 S.E.2d 621, 623-25 (1982), rev'd, 307 N.C.
584, 300 S.E.2d 689 (1983). The court of appeals invalidated the first aggravating factor-the
heinous nature of the offense-as to both charges because defendant's actions were no more heinous than those of others convicted of child abuse and voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 49, 295
S.E.2d at 624. The second aggravating factor-the age of the victim-was invalidated as to the
child abuse charge because the victim's age was an essential element of the crime. Id. at 48-49,
295 S.E.2d at 624.
36. Id. at 49-50, 295 S.E.2d at 624-25. The court of appeals had applied more stringent
criteria to refuse a finding of prejudice in State v. Locklear, 61 N.C. App. 594, 301 S.E.2d 437
(1983). The Locklear court held that even though an aggravating factor found by the trial court
was improper, defendant had failed to show prejudice because the trial judge, in his discretion,
could have ordered defendant to serve his multiple sentences consecutively for an even longer
term. Id. at 596-97, 301 S.E.2d at 439.
37. Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 585-86, 300 S.E.2d at 690-91.
38. The supreme court concluded that the nature of the manslaughter offense was especially
heinous, Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 606-07, 300 S.E.2d at 703, although it agreed with the court of
appeals that the child abuse actions were not. Id. at 599, 300 S.E.2d at 698-99. The supreme court
also disagreed with the court of appeals' determination that the victim's age could not be an
aggravating factor as to the child abuse charge. Although the age of the victim is an essential
eement of the crime, the court found that the extreme youth of Ahearn's victim (24 months)
supported the trial court's aggravation conclusion. Id. at 603, 300 S.E.2d at 701. Although defendant's dangerousness to others was upheld as an aggravating factor, defendant's dangerousness
to himself was invalidated as an aggravating factor to both charges. d. at 603-04, 300 S.E.2d at
701-02. Finally, the court invalidated defendant's plea of guilty of child abuse as a mitigating
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court held that a separate sentencing form is required for each offense. 3 9 This
requirement resembles that provided for special verdicts. 40 Separate listing of

factors enables a reviewing court to determine precisely which factors have
been found in aggravation or mitigation for each particular crime. Thus, if

41
any factor later is invalidated, the case can be remanded on that count alone.

Otherwise, as was the case in Ahearn, the case must be remanded for resen42
tencing if any factor is invalidated.
TheAhearn court also held that since the trial judge did not enunciate the

weight to be applied to each factor, a reviewing court that struck down an
aggravating factor was required to find prejudice to defendant. 43 Because that
particular violation may have prompted the trial judge to disregard the pre-

sumptive sentence, only a remand to the trial judge could result in a redetermination of the proper sentence.
The Ahearn court, however, was not satisfied with its settlement of the
separate findings and prejudice questions. The court sent an important

message to North Carolina trial judges. The court stated that "[tihe Fair Sentencing Act is an attempt to strike a balance between the inflexibility of a

presumptive sentence which insures [sic] that punishment is commensurate
with the crime, without regard to the nature of the offender; and the flexibility

of permitting punishment to be adapted.

. .

to the particular offender" 44 and

reiterated the language of section 15A-1340.4(b). "The sentencing judge's discretion to impose a sentence . . . greater . . . than the presumptive term, is
carefully guarded by the requirement that he make written findings in aggra-

vation and mitigation,
which findings must be proved by a preponderance of
45

the evidence."
After these statements expressing strong support for the Act, the Ahearn
court proceeded to undercut its requirements by announcing a narrow standard of appellate review; the Act "was not intended. . to remove all discretion from our able trial judges."' 4 6 The court concluded that, although trial
factor to the manslaughter charge because defendant denied wrongdoing in connection with the
baby's death. Id. at 607-08, 300 S.E.2d at 704.
39. Id. at 598, 300 S.E.2d at 698.
40. N.C.R. Ctv. P. 49(a). Special verdicts require a specific finding with respect to each element. This process enables a reviewing court to determine exactly what the fact-finder decided
and whether any overruled aspect of the case would have affected the holding.
41. The policy of favoring the special verdict is reflected by N.C.R. Civ. P. 40(d), which
states: "Where a special finding of facts is inconsistent with the general verdict, the former controls, and the judge shall give judgment accordingly."
42. Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 594, 300 S.E.2d at 696. For example, inAhearn the supreme court
agreed with the court of appeals that the nature of the child abuse was not especially heinous.
Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 599, 300 S.E.2d at 698. It is possible that the trial judge meant only for this
aggravating factor to apply to the manslaughter charge, a determination which was upheld. Id. at
606-07, 300 S.E.2d at 703-04. The lower court's failure to specify the charge to which the aggravating factor applied forced the appellate courts to examine the factor's relevance to all charges,
and to remand for resentencing any charge that was not aggravated by that factor.
43. Id. at 601, 300 S.E.2d at 701. See also State v. Chatman, 308 N.C. 169, 301 S.E.2d 71
(1983).
44. Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 596, 300 S.E.2d at 696.
45, Id.

46. Id. at 596, 300 S.E.2d at 697.
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judges were required to make written findings about the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors, they "should be permitted wide latitude in arriving
at the truth as to [their] existence. . . for it is only [the trial judge]
who ob47
serves the demeanor of the witnesses and hears the testimony."
The Ahearn court confused the trial judge's ability to weigh the credibility
of the witnesses-and thereby determine whether or not the factors exist on
the evidence-with the trial judge's ability to define the factors that should be
considered. Although reviewing courts usually do, and indeed should, defer to
trial courts' findings on witness credibility, 48 there is no reason for them to do
so on the definition of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Determining
whether an established fact is "reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing" is a matter of statutory interpretation, and therefore a matter of law, not
fact. 4 9 After making it clear that the trial court's written findings regarding the
existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances would be reviewed narrowly, the court stated that the trial judge, in determining whether and to what
degree the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating, "need not justify the weight he attaches to any factor." 50
The court should not have reached this conclusion; the statutory language
on which the court was relying is subject to a different interpretation. After
requiring the trial judge to list specifically the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 5' the statute states only that in imposing a sentence longer than
the presumptive sentence the judge "must find that the factors in aggravation
outweigh the factors in mitigation." 5 2 This statute could be interpreted either
as requiring the judge to state the weight attached to each factor, or as requiring that the balance tips in favor of the aggravating factors. The supreme
court, by choosing the latter interpretation, effectively foreclosed judicial re53
view of the weight attached to each factor.
Trial and appellate judges have taken the Ahearn court's narrow review
standard to heart. Appellate courts have upheld determinations of the following as aggravating circumstances: lying on the witness stand,5 4 prior offenses
bearing no relation to the crime charged,5 5 and premeditation in a second47. Id.
48. See General Specialties Co. v. Nello L. Teer Co., 41 N.C. App. 273, 254 S.E.2d 658

(1979).
49. See Young v. AAA Realty Co., 350 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D.N.C. 1972) (statutory interpreta-

tion is duty of higher courts).
50. Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 597, 300 S.E.2d at 697.
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.1(a) (1983).
52. Id. § 15A-1340.4(a).
53. Ahearn concluded that the trial judge could assign the same factor a different weight in
different cases. Thus, the court did not require him to state the weight given. Ahearn, 307 N.C. at
597, 300 S.E.2d at 697. The two concepts, however, are not synonymous. The trial judge need not
be required to give the same factor equal weight in all cases and yet could be required to make a
written finding as to the weight given the factor in each case. The reviewing court then could
ensure that undue weight was not placed on any single factor to avoid the intent of the legislature.
54. See State v. Thompson, 62 N.C. App. 38, 302 S.E.2d 310 (1983). See infra text accompanying notes 83-93.
55. See State v. Teague, 60 N.C. App. 755, 300 S.E.2d 6 (1983) (minor financial crimes considered by judge during a trial on attempted sodomy charges).
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degree murder case. 56 All findings of aggravating circumstances that have
been invalidated, except one, 57 involved factors that were essential elements of

the crime for which the defendant was convicted 5 8-a result mandated by statute. 59 Narrow review seriously undermines one of the theoretical bases for
presumptive sentencing-that the trial judge will be reluctant to sentence for

longer than the presumptive term when by so doing he runs a significant risk
60
of reversal.

There are more difficulties raised by the developing trend of narrow review than simply the defeat of the Act's attempts to limit the trial judge's dis-

cretion. To the extent that unbridled judicial discretion exists, past disparate
sentencing is perpetuated. When narrow review of the definition of aggravat-

ing factors is coupled with the Act's preponderance of the evidence standard,
possibilities of new abuse arise.
An example of such abuse occurred in State v. Melton. 6' In Melton defendant borrowed a pistol, purchased bullets, and test-fired the gun in a re-

mote area. 62 Defendant then drove to the victim's home, had a beer with the
victim, presumably to quell the victim's suspicions, and shot the victim
4
through the heart.63 He then drove to a police station and turned himself in.6
In exchange for the State's promise not to prosecute for first-degree murder,

defendant entered a plea of guilty to second-degree murder.65 A Class C fel66
ony, second-degree murder carries a presumptive sentence of fifteen years.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge found only one aggravating factorthat the killing had been committed with premeditation 7-and

sentenced de-

fendant to life in prison.6 8 Defendant appealed to the North Carolina
Supreme Court. He argued that facts supporting a charge that has been dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain may not be considered as aggravating factors of the lesser admitted charge 69 and that the judge could have found
premeditation only by relying on the evidence presented at trial. This
56. See State v. Melton, 307 N.C. 370, 298 S.E.2d 673 (1983). See infra text accompanying
notes 61-82.
57. See State v. Setzer, 61 N.C. App. 500, 301 S.E.2d 107 (factor that defendant had lied on
voir dire invalid), disc.rev. denied, 308 N.C. 680, 304 S.E.2d 760 (1983). See ii!fra text accompanying notes 94-99.
58. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 62 N.C. App. 38, 302 S.E.2d 310 (1983) (facts that defendant
armed and seeking pecuniary gain disallowed as aggravating factors in an armed robbery case);
State v. Massey, 62 N.C. App. 66, 302 S.E.2d 262 (1983) (fact that defendant travelled to apartment with a shotgun to seek revenge disallowed as an aggravating factor in attempted burglary
case).

59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(1) (1983) ("[e]vidence necessary to prove an element of
the offense may not be used to prove any factor in aggravation").
60. See supra text accompanying note 13.
61. 307 N.C. 370, 298 S.E.2d 673 (1983).
62. Id. at 371, 298 S.E.2d at 675.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 372-73, 298 S.E.2d at 676.
66. Id. at 373, 298 S.E.2d at 676.
67. Id. at 372, 298 S.E.2d at 675.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 373, 298 S.E.2d at 676.
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"amounted to the use of the same evidence to prove the elements of murder in
the second degree as well as the aggravating factor of premeditation and deliberation." 70 Defendant argued
that the trial judge effectively had convicted
71
him of the higher crime.

Although the Act specifically exempts sentences to which both sides agree
pursuant to a plea arrangement, 72 there had been confusion about whether
bargained-for guilty pleas implicitly included an agreement to the presumptive
term for the crime. 73 The supreme court ended this confusion and rejected
defendant's assertion that he had bargained for a fifteen-year sentence by
agreeing to plead guilty to second-degree murder. 74 Thus, after Melton defense attorneys should be careful in agreeing to have their clients plead guilty
to specific sentences.
More importantly, Melton rejected defendant's argument that the trial
court incorrectly had included an essential element of the crime of first-degree
murder as an aggravating circumstance to the charge of second-degree murder.75 The court grounded its decision on the fact that premeditation is not an
essential element of second-degree murder and, therefore, its inclusion is not
prohibited by the Act.76 The court asserted that such a factor is reasonably
related to the stated purposes of the Act. 77 Although Melton noted that some
difficulties might arise, the court stated that the bargained plea situation differed from the situation in which a jury acquitted defendant of first-degree
murder but convicted him of second-degree murder. 78 The court, however,
refused to conclude that premeditation could not constitute an aggravating
circumstance even in that situation, 79 despite the fact that the court seemingly
would be invading the province of the jury.
A more subtle problem than invading the province of the jury arises with
allowing the essential elements of a higher crime to be used in aggravation of
the lower one. Ordinarily, each essential element of the crime must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.80 In finding the existence of an aggravating factor, however, the trial judge is held only to a preponderance of the evidence
standard. 8' Under Melon, it is not difficult to envision a situation in which a
prosecutor, uncertain of his ability to sway a jury to find all the elements of the
higher crime beyond a reasonable doubt, could charge defendant with the
lower crime and hope that, at the sentencing hearing, he could convince the
trial judge of any remaining elements of the higher crime under the lower
70. Id. at 373-74, 298 S.E.2d at 676.
71. Id.
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(b) (1983).

73. Comment, supra note 7, at 637.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Melton, 307 N.C. at 373-74, 298 S.E.2d at 676.
Id. at 375, 298 S.E.2d at 677. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983).
Melton, 307 N.C. at 376, 298 S.E.2d at 678.
Id. at 375 n.2, 298 S.E.2d at 677 n.2.
Id.
See, e.g., State v. Batts, 269 N.C. 694, 153 S.E.2d 379 (1967).
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983).
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standard of proof. Such presentation to the judge during sentencing could
result in surprise to defense counsel, with the end result being inadequate de82
fense to the additional essential elements.
State v. Thompson 83 is illustrative of the worst scenario that has occurred
84
under the Act. In Thompson defendant was convicted of armed robbery.
The trial judge found four aggravating factors.8 5 The fourth factor was that
"defendant deliberately presented, during the course of the trial, evidence
which he knew to be false about his presence on the day in question and deliberately presented false evidence concerning the statement attributed to him
and obviouslyfound by the jury to be false."8 6 After finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating, the trial judge sentenced defend87
ant to twenty years in prison.
Defendant sought relief in the North Carolina Court of Appeals on the
ground that all four aggravating factors were improper. s8 The court concluded that two of the factors were essential elements of the armed robbery
charge,8 9 and that defendant had waived his objection to the third. 90 Finally,
the court, emphasizing the stated purpose of the Act, held that the fourth aggravating factor was:
[a]cceptable as an aggravating factor because it is reasonably related
to the purposes of the statute and the rehabilitation of the offender
and provides a general deterrent to criminal behavior. A defendant's
truthfulness under oath is probative of his attitudes toward society
and his prospects for rehabilitation and is therefore relevant to
sentencing. 9 1
Although defendant contended that by allowing lying on the stand to be an
aggravating circumstance the court had enabled the trial judge to convict defendant of perjury, a crime with which he was not charged, 92 the court concluded that, "[t]he fact that defendant could be tried for perjury at another
trial before another judge and jury pales in the face of the immediate need for
truth at the initial trial."'93 This conclusion, however, ignores the significance
of defendant effectively having been convicted of perjury without the benefit
of a jury or any of the other safeguards of a criminal trial, such as crossexamination of the witnesses. The court attempted to distinguish State v.
82. In addition, when a crime lower than a Class A or B felony is charged, such action may
avoid the additional safeguards reserved for these felonies by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983).

These safeguards include jury determination of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and
stricter
83.
84.
85.

appellate review. See infra note 106.
62 N.C. App. 38, 302 S.E.2d 310 (1983).
Id. at 39, 302 S.E.2d at 311.
Id. at 42, 302 S.E.2d at 313.

86. Id. (emphasis added).
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Seeid. at 39, 43, 302 S.E.2d at 311, 313.
See id. at 42, 302 S.E.2d at 313.
Id. at 42-43, 302 S.E.2d at 313.
Id. at 43, 302 S.E.2d at 313.
Id.
Id. at 43, 302 S.E.2d at 314.
Id.
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Seizer,94 a case that the court of appeals remanded because of an improper

finding that lying on voir dire was aggravating, by stating that Selzer "involved contradicted testimony at a voir dire hearing which is a far cry from a
finding of perjured testimony before a judge and jury." 95 In Thompson, however, no finding of perjury ever was made by a jury, nor was the issue debated
in open court.
Sound objections to this reasoning in Thompson were raised by Judge
Becton, who concurred in the result. 96 Judge Becton first noted that Selzer
held that "a judge cannot find as an aggravating factor that the defendant did
not testify truthfully when the only evidence of his untruthfulness is his contradicted testimony at avoirdire hearing or duringtrial."97 Any other holding
would increase defendant's sentence based on an alleged crime with which he
was not charged. 98 Judge Becton noted:
In adopting the Fair Sentencing Act, our legislature rejected the
prevalent sentencing philosophy of fitting the punishment to the offender through long statutory maximum terms and broad judicial
discretion and adopted a sentencing philosophy of fitting punishment
to the crime by application of presumptive sentences. Therefore, as
suggested by defendant, if the Fair Sentencing Act is to achieve its
goal of eliminating disparate sentencing, it must be read to limit the
myriad of factors that were considered appropriate when fitting the
punishment to the offender was the watchword. 99
In addition, in finding that lying on the stand was an acceptable aggravating circumstance, the majority relied heavily upon the United States Supreme
Court decision in UnitedStatesv. Grayson. t°° In Grayson the Court refused to
overturn the use of a finding of false testimony as an aggravating circumstance. Argument, however, centered on the constitutionality of sentencing a
criminal defendant for false testimony-to do so arguably "chills" defendants'
first amendment rights to testify on their own behalf.'01 The lack of a charge
and a jury finding was addressed directly only in the dissent. 10 2 Justice Stewart, refusing to join the majority, stated:
The Court begins its consideration of this case. . . with the assumption that the respondent gave false testimony at his trial. But there
was no determination that his testimony was false. This respondent
was given a greater sentence than he would otherwise have re94. 61 N.C. App. 500, 301 S.E.2d 107, disc. rev. denied, 308 N.C. 680, 304 S.E.2d 760 (1983).
95. Thompson, 62 N.C. App. at 44, 302 S.E.2d at 314.
96. Id. at 44, 302 S.E.2d at 314 (Becton, J., concurring). Judge Becton concurred in the remand to resentence defendant, naming the incorrect use of untruthfulness as an additional aggravating factor.
97. Id. (Becton, J., concurring) (quoting State v. Setzer, 61 N.C. App. 500, 505, 301 S.E.2d
107, 110, disc. rev. denied, 308 N.C. 680, 304 S.E.2d 760 (1983)).
98. Id. at 45, 302 S.E.2d at 314 (Becton, J., concurring).
99. Id. (Becton, J., concurring).
100. 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
101. Id. at 52-53. The Court held that the right guaranteed defendant was the right to testify
truthfully; therefore, punishment for lying under oath was not a first amendment violation, Id.
102. Id. at 55-56 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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ceived-how much greater we have no way of knowing-solely 10be3
cause a single judge thought that he had not testified truthfully.
holdThus, the Grayson case is inadequate support for the Thompson court's
04
ing that separate crimes should be considered aggravating factors.'
The Fair Sentencing Act is in danger of being "interpreted away." Judicial emasculation of the Act's effectiveness would represent a loss to North
Carolina. To the extent that judges' discretion is upheld uniformly, the
problems sought to be remedied by the General Assembly's Commission on
Correctional Programs 0 5 will be perpetuated. The Act's deterrent effect will
be lost as the certainty of sentence terms erodes. Finally, as trial judges have
shown themselves more willing to find aggravating than mitigating factors,
North Carolina's burdensome prison population will not be reduced. There is,
however, more at stake than the General Assembly's stated goals. All too
often the criminal justice system focuses on the individual rather than the
crime. This focus raises the possibility of personal prejudice. Since the physical freedom of the defendant is dependent on the expansive exercise of the
trial judge's discretion, outside safeguards are necessary to protect both the
defendant and the integrity of the criminal justice system. Such safeguards are
in place for North Carolina capital defendants,' 0 6 but also are necessary to
protect noncapital defendants' rights. The Fair Sentencing Act erected safeguards by shifting the focus away from the individual and by requiring a reviewable trial record. Unless these safeguards are defended, trial judges will
continue to focus on individual defendants rather than on the crimes with
which they were charged.
GRADY LEE SHIELDS

103. Id.
104. The North Carolina courts probably will not abandon this position on their own, but will
continue to construe the Act with the same hostility demonstrated by the General Assembly's first
attempt at passage. Legislative clarification would be helpful.
105. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
106. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983). These protections include jury determination
of aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. § 15A-2000(b). Section 15A-2000(c)(2) requires that
the jury make a written finding that the aggravating factors themselves are substantial enough for
imposition of the death penalty, not merely that they outweigh the mitigating factors. Section
15A-2000(d) provides for automatic review of the jury's written findings, including a review of
whether the findings were made as a result of passion or prejudice. Finally, § 15A-2000(e) limits
aggravating factors to eleven enumerated areas.

